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Antitrust
by Jeffrey S. Cashdan'
and Christine A. Hopkinson*
This Article surveys substantive antitrust decisions issued between
January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013, by the United States Supreme
Court for cases that originated in the Eleventh Circuit, by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and by the United
States district courts within the Eleventh Circuit.
I.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECIsIONs

During 2013, the United States Supreme Court decided two important
antitrust cases that originated in the Eleventh Circuit. In FTC v.
Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,' the Court clarified the state-action
doctrine.' In the second case, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Court addressed the controversial issue of "reverse-payment settlements" between
brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers, and
held that, at least in that particular case, such a settlement may harm
competition.
The Supreme Court's decision in Phoebe Putney is significant for its
clarification of the extent to which a broad, general state statute can
immunize anticompetitive conduct. The case began when the FTC filed
a complaint to stop Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital and its related
entities (collectively, Phoebe Putney), as well as the Hospital Authority
of Albany-Dougherty County (Hospital Authority), from acquiring

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Claremont McKenna
College (B.A. 1987); University of Chicago (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Senior Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Wisconsin (B.A., 1998); Columbia University (J.D., 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The views expressed in this Article are the personal opinions of the Authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of King & Spalding LLP or any of its clients.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).

2. Id. at 1016-17.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
4. Id. at 2234.
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Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc. (Palmyra), the only other general acute-care
hospital in a six-county area and Phoebe Putney's main competitor.5
The FTC alleged that the acquisition would create "a virtual monopoly
for inpatient general acute care services sold to commercial health plans
and their customers in Albany, Georgia and its surrounding area." But
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
denied the FTC's effort to enjoin the transaction, holding that because
the Hospital Authority owned Phoebe Putney, the acquisition was
protected from antitrust scrutiny by the state-action doctrine.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
although it also stated that "[w]e agree with the Commission that, on
the facts alleged, the joint operation of [Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital] and Palmyra would substantially lessen competition or tend
to create, if not create, a monopoly."8
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision and held
that the state-action doctrine did not immunize Phoebe Putney's
acquisition of Palmyra from antitrust scrutiny.' Specifically, the Court
held that there was no clearly articulated state policy authorizing
conduct such as Phoebe Putney's acquisition of the only other general,
acute-care hospital in the region, and that Georgia's grant of power to
state hospital authorities to acquire other hospitals was no different
from similar powers granted to all corporations.o As such, the
granting of that power did not give the Hospital Authority, or Phoebe
Putney, carte blanche to act in a manner that harmed competition.
Thus, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision denying the
FTC's request for an injunction on state-action immunity grounds. 2
After the Supreme Court's decision, the FTC renewed its administrative proceeding against Phoebe Putney and the Hospital Authority and
its suit for injunctive relief pending the outcome of that administrative
proceeding. By that time, Phoebe Putney had already completed its
acquisition of Palmyra, and the Georgia Department of Community
Health had already granted Phoebe Putney a single operating license for
both hospitals. The District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
granted the FTC's motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent

5. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1008.
6. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 2011 F.T.C. LEXIS 64, at *2 (Apr. 19, 2011).
7. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1008-09; see also FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
8. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2011).
9. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1017.
10. Id. at 1011-12, 1015.
11. Id. at 1012.
12. Id. at 1017.
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the two hospitals from any further integration and to prohibit them from
increasing prices for any contracts already in place, thus maintaining
the "status quo" while the FTC's administrative process was moving
forward. The court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction for
the same purpose.' 3 In the end, the FTC entered into a settlement
agreement with Phoebe Putney and the other defendants that left
Phoebe Putney in control of both hospitals. 4
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,15 the Supreme Court held that the FTC's
lawsuit challenging a reverse-payment settlement should have been
allowed to proceed. 6 Reverse-payment settlements are simply settlements that resolve patent infringement lawsuits relating to pharmaceuticals and their generic challengers.' Specifically, when a generic drug
manufacturer seeks FDA approval for a new drug that does the same
thing as a brand-name drug already on the market, the generic drug
manufacturer frequently assures the FDA that its drug will not infringe
the brand-name drug's patents, or claims that those patents are
invalid.'" Invariably, that claim results in the brand-name drug
manufacturer suing the generic drug manufacturer for patent infringement.'9 In many instances, such cases are settled when the brandname drug manufacturer agrees to pay the generic drug manufacturer
millions of dollars to delay the generic drug's entry into the market.o
Such settlements are referred to as "reverse payments" because the
plaintiff patent-holder pays the defendant, who presumably had no claim
for damages in the first place."
In this particular case, the FTC sued the brand-name drug manufacturer and several generic drug manufacturers, all of whom had entered
into a settlement agreement in 2006. The settlement involved the
brand-name drug manufacturer paying the generic drug manufacturers
hundreds of millions of dollars and the generic drug manufacturers
agreeing not to bring their products to market until 2015.2 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

13. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92321, at *3-5
(M.D. Ga. June 5, 2013).
14. Proposed Consent Agreement: In re Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 78 Fed. Reg.
53457 (Aug. 29, 2013).
15. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
16. Id. at 2227.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2228.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2227, 2229.
21. Id. at 2227, 2231.
22. Id. at 2229.
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dismissed the FTC's lawsuit, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld that
dismissal, holding that "a reverse payment settlement agreement
generally is 'immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent.'"
The Supreme Court, however, reversed that decision and held that
even if the result of the agreement was within the scope of the brandname drug manufacturer's patent rights and the exclusivity that those
rights grant to the brand-name drug manufacturer, the FTC should have
been permitted to pursue its case to show the anticompetitive effects of
the agreement.' In so holding, the Court set out five "sets of considerations" that it thought to be decisive: (1) that "the specific restraint at
issue has the 'potential for genuine adverse effects on competition;'" 25
(2) that the "anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes prove
unjustified; 26 (3) that "where a reverse payment threatens to work
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the
power to bring that harm about in practice;" 7 (4) that "an antitrust
action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh
Circuit believed;"28 and (5) "the fact that a large, unjustified reverse
payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from
settling their lawsuit."" Although the Court made a point of explaining why its decision should not be considered a departure from its past
holdings,o Chief Justice Roberts issued a strong dissent in the case,"
which has already caused at least one lower court to express dismay at
the prospect of applying Actavis to future reverse-payment cases. 32
II.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS

In Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on

23. Id. at 2227 (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir.
2012)).
24. Id. at 2234.
25. Id. (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986)).
26. Id. at 2235-36.
27. Id. at 2236.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2237.
30. Id. at 2233.
31. Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
32. See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. 11), MDL Docket No. 2084, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174273, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013).
33. 711 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2013).
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The plaintiff in the case, Sunbeam Television
standing grounds.'
Corp. (Sunbeam), which operated a network-affiliated television station
in Miami, brought antitrust claims against Nielsen Media Research, Inc.
(Nielsen), a television ratings service provider, after Nielsen changed its
ratings method to employ a different audience measurement tool and
Sunbeam's ratings dropped. Sunbeam alleged that Nielsen had engaged
in exclusionary conduct to maintain its monopoly on television ratings
services in the Miami-Fort Lauderdale market. Specifically, Sunbeam
alleged that but for Nielsen's exclusionary conduct, other television
ratings service providers would have entered the market and offered
customers a better audience measurement tool than the one Nielsen
used and this conduct resulted in a decline in ratings for Sunbeam."
In analyzing Sunbeam's claim, the Eleventh Circuit focused, as had
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on
whether Sunbeam had antitrust standing-an analysis that typically
involves an inquiry into whether there is an antitrust injury and
whether the plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.36 In
this case, the court began with the efficient-enforcer inquiry and held
that Sunbeam was not an efficient enforcer because it could not show a
causal connection between the alleged exclusionary conduct and its
alleged injury." The critical point for the court's determination was
that Sunbeam was required to show, but had not shown, that there were
other television ratings service providers who were willing and able to
enter the Miami-Fort Lauderdale market and who had not entered
because of the exclusionary conduct.3 ' Thus, the court affirmed the
district court's holding that in the absence of such a showing, Sunbeam
could not establish a causal connection between the alleged conduct and
its alleged injury, and therefore, it was not an efficient enforcer of the
antitrust laws." As a result, the court affirmed partial summary
judgment for Nielsen on antitrust standing grounds. 40
In Gulf States Reorganization Group, Inc. v. Nucor Corp.," the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Nucor because the
plaintiff, Gulf States Reorganization Group (GSRG), had failed to
support its alleged relevant market."' GSRG claimed that Nucor

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1267-69, 1273-74.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272-73.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id.
721 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1287.
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attempted to monopolize the product market for black, hot-rolled coiled
steel by working with third parties to purchase a steel plant in Alabama
out of bankruptcy, thus ensuring that none of Nucor's competitors would
be able to use the plant to compete with Nucor." The court, however,
held that GSRG could not support its relevant product market because
it failed to account for the fact that manufacturers of "pickled and oiled"
steel-black, hot-rolled coiled steel that has undergone an additional
process-could easily shift their manufacturing efforts to produce more
black, hot-rolled coiled steel, particularly if the prices for black, hotrolled coiled steel increased."
Because GSRG's relevant product
market excluded those manufacturers and did not take into account the
cross-elasticity of supply with pickled and oiled steel, its relevant market
definition failed, and as a consequence, its attempted monopolization
claim failed as well."
III.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS

During 2013, the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit issued four
notable antitrust decisions. All four decisions were issued from only two
courts-the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida and the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.
In Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc.," the Southern District of Florida
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and permitted the plaintiff's
claim of a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act" to proceed." The case involved a dispute between parties to a contract for
the distribution and marketing of softgel capsules used for pharmaceuticals. Procaps owned the softgel technology, and Patheon had the right
to market that technology under the parties' agreement. During the
contract term, however, Patheon purchased another company that
competed with Procaps, in that it also specialized in softgel products.
Procaps raised its concerns about the acquisition with Patheon, who
failed to address the concerns. Procaps filed suit, claiming that its
contract with Patheon, though initially a procompetitive vertical
agreement, was now, by virtue of Patheon's acquisition of a company in
competition with Procaps, an unreasonable restraint on trade and a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. Patheon moved to dismiss Procaps's

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1287.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35640 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2013).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35640, at *7, *9.
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claims, but the court denied the motion, holding that Procaps had
sufficiently alleged a per se violation in light of the now-horizontal
nature of the contract.49 The court further held that Procaps had
standing to bring its claim because it had alleged an antitrust injurythat is, "an 'injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful."'6 0
In Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estie Lauder Cos.," another case from
the Southern District of Florida, the court granted defendant Est6e
Lauder's motion to dismiss claims by Duty Free Americas (DFA).52
DFA claimed that Est6e Lauder had conspired with DFA's competitors
to exclude DFA from the market for duty-free retail shops in airports
and that Estee Lauder had also conspired with DFA's competitors to
monopolize the market for beauty products sold in those shops. The
dispute arose when Est6e Lauder announced an increase in prices on the
beauty products that duty-free retailers purchased from Est6e Lauder
and sold in airport shops. DFA did not want to accept the price increase
and stopped purchasing beauty products from Estee Lauder. When
Estee Lauder did not actually raise its prices as planned, however, DFA
tried to renew its relationship with Est6e Lauder, but Est6e Lauder
refused. DFA later submitted bids to various airports to operate their
duty-free retail shops, but the fact that DFA did not carry Est&e Lauder
products-a fact that Estee Lauder was partly responsible for communicating to the airports-cost DFA several of the airport contracts. DFA
claimed that Estee Lauder's refusal to deal with DFA and its communications with the airports were part of an anticompetitive agreement to
exclude DFA from the market for United States airport duty-free stores
and to monopolize the market for selling beauty products in those
stores." DFA also alleged that Est6e Lauder attempted to monopolize
the market for beauty products in duty-free stores, in violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act."
The court dismissed DFA's Sherman Act § 1 claim because DFA had
not plausibly alleged an anticompetitive agreement between Est6e
Lauder and DFA's competitors. 5 The court held that Est6e Lauder and

49. Id. at *2-3, *5-7.
50. Id. at *7 (quoting Gulf States Reorg. Grp., Inc. v. Nucor Corp., 466 F.3d 961, 966
(11th Cir. 2006)).
51. 946 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
52. Id. at 1324.
53. Id. at 1324-29.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1334.
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DFA's competitors had independent economic incentives to communicate
to the airports which bidders carried Estee Lauder products." For
Esthe Lauder, it was reasonable to want an airport to choose a bidder
that carried its products; for DFA's competitors, it was reasonable to
want an airport to know that they carried the popular beauty products." Thus, the court held that the independent reasons for Est6e
Lauder and DFA's competitors to take the alleged actions were more
plausible than DFA's allegation that the actions were the result of an
illegal agreement to exclude DFA from the market or to monopolize the
market." On DFA's attempted monopolization claim, the court held
that DFA had failed to allege anticompetitive conduct and that DFA's
factual allegations actually suggested a competitive market for beauty
products sold in airportduty-free stores."9
In Clifton-Draperv. Pelam International,Ltd., the Middle District
of Florida granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim.61 The case arose out of Pelam's refusal
to sell its products to the plaintiffs, following a trademark dispute.62
In addition, Pelam entered into a contract with one of its customers to
prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining Pelam's products indirectly through
that customer. The plaintiffs sued Pelam, claiming that Pelam's contract
with the other customer violated the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs,
however, did not allege a relevant market for their claim. Thus, they
could not allege that the agreement between Pelam and its customer had
an adverse effect on competition in any relevant market. The court held
that the failure to show-or even allege-a relevant market was fatal to
the plaintiffs' claims, and that the Sherman Act protected competition,
not individual competitors." As a result, the court granted Pelam's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims."
Similarly, in Astro Tel, Inc. v. Verizon Florida,LLC, the other 2013
antitrust decision from the Middle District of Florida, the plaintiff's
monopolization claims failed on the relevant market element.66 In that
case, Astro Tel alleged several non-antitrust and antitrust claims against

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337-38.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148664 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2013).
Id. at *2, *18.
Id. at *3-5.
Id. at *5-7, *9, *17-18.
Id. at *18.
979 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
Id. at 1293.
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Verizon; the antitrust claims included three separate Sherman Act § 2
claims: monopolization, attempted monopolization, and monopoly
leveraging. All of the claims arose out of Verizon's alleged conduct as
the incumbent local exchange carrier, whose services Astro Tel
purchased and resold. For each of Astro Tel's claims, however, it had
to support its alleged relevant market, which in the Eleventh Circuit
requires expert testimony." Nevertheless, Astro Tel failed to support
its allegations with expert testimony, and the court granted Verizon
summary judgment on the antitrust claims.69

67. Id. at 1289-90, 1292.
68. Id. at 1292-93.
69. Id. at 1293-94 (The court granted summary judgment on the non-antitrust claims
as well, but for different reasons.).

